Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and two characterizations on subclasses of games are provided.
Introduction
In this paper we introduce and study three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. An example of a cooperative situation with uncertain payoffs is the following. Two firms will be temporarily working together in an R&D project. Although the profit of this project is yet uncertain, the firms sign a contract beforehand in which their profit shares are written down.
Cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000) . In these games the payoff to a coalition is not known with certainty and is modelled as a random variable.
Further, the preferences of the players and the possible allocations of the payoffs are of a specific type.
Another model of games where the payoffs to the coalitions are random variables is the model of stochastic cooperative games as discussed in Suijs (2000) . The difference between these games and cooperative games with random payoffs lies in the assumptions on the preferences and the structure of the set of possible allocations of the payoffs (see Timmer et al. (2000) ).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) is a solution concept for cooperative TU games for which several equivalent formulations exist. One of these formulations is that the Shapley value equals the average of the marginal vectors. Suijs (2000) considered this formulation of the Shapley value but was not able to extend it to his model of stochastic cooperative games because, among others, a marginal vector of a stochastic cooperative game need not be uniquely defined. Nevertheless, the nucleolus, a solution concept for TU games that we do not discuss here, has been successfully extended to stochastic cooperative games (cf. Suijs (1996 Suijs ( , 2000 ).
Inspired by the equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for TU games we define three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. We study properties of these solution concepts and give two characterizations on subclasses of games. The first one is on the class of games where all players have identical preferences of a specific 'linear' type. On this class of games with random payoffs the three solution concepts coincide. The second one is a characterization on the class of one-person and two-person games, where again the three solutions coincide. These two characterizations are based on characterizations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) , and by Myerson (1980) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998) , respectively. Further, an example shows that the solutions may all be different for three-person games. This paper is organized in four sections. In section 2 we briefly recall the main basic features of cooperative games with random payoffs. The three solution concepts are introduced in section 3. In section 4 properties of the solution concepts are studied and the two characterizations are provided.
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs that are omitted in the text.
Cooperative games with random payoffs
A cooperative game with random payoffs is a tuple (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ). N is the finite player set. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N . The nonnegative random payoff to coalition S is denoted by R(S) and S is the set of coalitions with a nonzero payoff. The set A contains all possible individual payoffs that a player may receive from the coalitional payoffs and α i is a function that describes how player i compares two random payoffs. Below we explain these ingredients in more detail.
Let N = {1, . . ., n}. Denote by |S| the cardinality of coalition S. Let L + be the set of all nonnegative random variables with finite expectation. The payoff zero for sure is denoted by 0.
The payoff R(S) to coalition S is assumed to be an element of L + . S is the set of coalitions with a nonzero payoff, S = {S ⊂ N |R(S) = 0, S = ∅}. We assume the following about the payoffs.
The reason for this assumption is explained in section 3. Assumption 2.1 If R(T ) = 0 for some coalition T then R(S) = 0 for all coalitions S such that for i = 1, . . . , n. The Shapley value φ(v) is equal to the average of the marginal vectors:
for all i ∈ N . For cooperative games with random payoffs we define marginal vectors as follows. Let
is the marginal contribution of player σ(i) to coalition S σ i−1 . This contribution is the remainder of R(S σ i ) after the players in S σ i−1 received parts that they find equivalent to their marginal contributions. Assumption 2.1 is necessary to avoid situations where
for all i ∈ N . Let G N be the class of games (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) with random payoffs and with player set N . A solution for cooperative games with random payoffs is a function Ψ on G N such that Ψ(G) is an allocation pR(N ) for the game G ∈ G N .
In a straightforward way we define the marginal value 3 Φ m for cooperative games with random payoffs as the average of the marginal vectors.
A second formulation of φ(v) uses the dividends per capita d S (v) of the coalitions S, as introduced by Harsanyi (1959) . These numbers are calculated in a recursive way:
Now the Shapley value of (N, v) can be written as
for all i ∈ N . For a cooperative game with random payoffs G we define the dividend per capita d S (G) of coalition S as follows:
3 In Timmer et al. (2000) this value is called the Shapley value. Here, we consider three values based on the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. To avoid confusion, we have renamed this value as the marginal value.
5
The dividend per capita of a one-person coalition is equal to its payoff. If S contains more than one player then we start with its payoff R(S). Given a subset T of S, T = S, we give each player j ∈ T the dividend per capita d T (G) expressed as a multiple of R(S). After we have done so for all sets T ⊂ S, T = S, we divide the remainder of R(S) by |S| to obtain the dividend per capita. The dividend value Φ d is an extension of (3.2) and is defined by
for all i ∈ N . Player i receives the dividends per capita, expressed in multiples of R(N ), of all the coalitions to which he belongs.
A third formulation is given by Derks, Haller and Peters (2000) and |Γ(N )| = n k=2 k ( n k ) . The selector vector m γ (v) corresponding to γ ∈ Γ(N ) is defined by
for all i ∈ N , player i receives the dividends of those coalitions S for which γ(S) = i, and we have
For a cooperative game with random payoffs G define the dividend of coalition S, ∆ S (G), by
The dividend ∆ S (G) of a one-person coalition S is equal to its dividend per capita, namely R(S).
For coalitions S with more than one player we take a subset T of S. The dividend ∆ T (G) is divided equally among the players in T . Player j ∈ T receives the amount α j (
which is equivalent for him to ∆ T (G)/|T |. The dividend of coalition S is all that remains of R(S)
after the dividends of the subcoalitions T have been divided. The following lemma shows that the dividend ∆ S (G) is closely related to the dividend per capita d S (G).
Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and let S be a coalition. We show by induction that ∆ S (G) = |S|d S (G).
for all coalitions T with 1 ≤ |T | ≤ k, k < |N|. Let S be a coalition with |S| = k + 1. We obtain
where the second equality follows from induction and the third equality from the definition of the dividend per capita d S (G).
2
The selector vector
The selector value Φ s is the average of these selector vectors,
A first remark on these definitions is that a marginal vector need not be a selector vector, as opposed to the case for cooperative TU games. Secondly, notice that M γ (G) need not be an efficient and R(N ) ∼ U ([3, 7]), that is, R(N) is uniformly distributed over the interval [3, 7] . We see that
Let β 1 = β 3 = 1/2 and β 2 = 1/4. Recall from section 2 that u X β i = sup{t ∈ IR|Pr{X ≤ t} ≤ β i } is the β i -quantile of the random variable X. All the players i ∈ N have quantile preferences, thus
From this we obtain the maps α i for all i ∈ N .
The dividends of the various coalitions are
, R(N )) = 0 + 0 = 0 and for player 3 m γ 3 (G) = α 3 (∆ {3} (G), R(N )) = 1/5. The corresponding selector vector M γ (G) = (3/4, 0, 1/5)R(N) is not an efficient allocation of R(N ). In fact, all the selector vectors in this example are not efficient but the selector value is an efficient allocation of R(N ) (this is a corollary of theorem 4.4).
4 Properties and characterizations on subclasses of games
In this section we present properties of the solution concepts that we introduced in the previous section.
For two subclasses of games where the three solution concepts coincide we provide characterizations of these solutions.
The three solution concept satisfy most of these properties. Proof. We only show the efficiency of Φ d . The remainder of the proof is left to the reader. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a game with random payoffs. The dividend per capita of coalition N is by definition
By lemma 2.3 we have R(N ) ).
Rearranging terms leads to
T ⊂N j∈T α j (d T (G), R(N )) = 1.
(4.3)
Hence, i∈N S:i∈S
where the last equality follows from (4.3). We conclude that Φ d is an efficient allocation of R(N ). 2
We introduce another property based on its counterpart for TU games as in Young (1985) .
(v) A solution concept Ψ on G N satisfies strong monotonicity if for all i ∈ N and for all games
Now we have the following result. 
Next, consider the situation where R(N ) = 0 and Q(N ) = 0. By definition (4.4) equals
for all permutations σ where variables without (with) an accent refer to the game G (G ). Applying statement 2 of lemma 2.3 gives
for all σ ∈ Π(N ). This implies that
and once again by statement 2 of lemma 2.3 we get
Similar reasoning shows that this result also holds if R(N ) = 0 and Q(N ) = 0 or if R(N ) = 0 and Q(N ) = 0.
2
The following example shows that this result need not hold if one of the functions f i is not linear. We concentrate on player 1. Let f 1 N and f 1 N be surjective, continuous and strictly increasing functions such that
From item 1 of assumption 2.2 and from f 1 N (9) = 1/10, f 1 N (8) = 1/10 and 9 > 8 it follows that
Similarly we obtain M σ 2 1 (G) 1 M σ 2 1 (G ). Hence, for player 1 we have M σ 1 (G) 1 M σ 1 (G ) for all permutations σ. Once again by assumption 2.2 and by f 1 N (12) = 3/20, f 1 N (11) = 3/20 and 12 > 11 we get Φ m 1 (G ) = 3/20Q(N ) 1 3/20R(N ) = Φ m 1 (G).
We conclude that the marginal value does not satisfy strong monotonicity.
3
The selector value and the dividend value are equal for games where all the players i ∈ N have linear functions f i . 
where the fourth equality follows from γ(S) ∈ S. 
Theorem 4.5 For all
where the second equality follows from statement 1 of lemma 2.3. For R({σ(1)}) = 0 this result also
and so,
for R(S σ 2 )) = 0. If R(S σ 2 ) = 0 then also R(S σ 1 ) = 0 and m σ σ(2) (G) = 0 = m σ σ(2) (v)/v(N ) holds for the same reason as above.
If R(S σ k+1 ) = 0 then Y σ σ(k+1) = 0 because it is a multiple of R(S σ k+1 ). Also, R(S σ j ) = 0 for all j ≤ k + 1 by assumption 2.1 and so m σ σ(k+1) (G) = 0 = m σ σ(k+1) (v)/v(N ). We have shown by induction that m σ (G) = m σ (v)/v(N ).
Similar reasoning as for the marginal vectors shows that α i (d S (G), R(N )) = d S (v)/v(N ) for all coalitions S and i ∈ N . Thus we have
and by (3.1) and (3.2)
for all players i ∈ N .
2 Furthermore, there exists a characterization of these solution concepts on the class of games GLI N . This characterization is based on a characterization of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) . ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity as defined for cooperative TU games by Young (1985) . In theorem A.1 of the appendix we show that the Shapley value φ is the unique solution on SG N that satisfies efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Hence,
If v(N) = 0 then we have R(N ) = 0. By efficiency and symmetry we have Ψ i (G) = 0 = Φ m i (G) for all i ∈ N .
2
We will now turn our attention to games with random payoffs that need not have linear functions
The subgame of G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) restricted to coalition T is denoted by
LetḠ N = ∪ M ∈2 N \{∅} G M be the class of cooperative games with random payoffs and player set N , and all of its subgames. A sixth property for solution concepts onḠ N is based on the balanced contributions property for cooperative TU games by Myerson (1980) .
(vi)
A solution concept Ψ onḠ N is said to have balanced contributions if for all games G ∈ G N , for all coalitions T ⊂ N and for all i, j ∈ T , i = j, we have
We have the following results concerning two-person games. Proof. Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a two-person game with N = {1, 2}. If R(N) = 0 then R({1}) = R({2}) = 0 by assumption 2.1. For any of the two permutations σ we have M σ σ(1) = α σ(1) (R({σ(1)}), R(N))R(N) = α σ(1) (0, 0)R(N ) = 1 · R(N)(= 0) M σ σ(2) = (1 − α σ(1) (0, 0))R(N ) = 0 · R(N)(= 0) and the average of these marginal vectors is Φ m (G) = (1/2, 1/2)R(N ) = (0, 0). In a similar way we can show that Φ d (G) = Φ s (G) = (0, 0) because these are also multiples of R(N ) = 0. Now assume that R(N ) = 0. Let σ 1 (1) = 1, σ 1 (2) = 2, σ 2 (1) = 2 and σ 2 (2) = 1. The corresponding marginal vectors are
and the marginal value equals
The dividends per capita are d {i} (G) = R({i}), i = 1, 2, for the one-person coalitions and for the 
, R(N )) and so, M γ 1 (G) = M σ 2 (G). Analogously, for selector function γ 2 we have M γ 2 (G) = M σ 1 (G). We conclude that the selector value Φ s (G), the average of the selector vectors, coincides with the marginal value Φ m (G), the average of the marginal vectors.
Finally, we check balanced contributions for the grand coalition N . By efficiency Φ m i (G {i} ) = R({i}) for i = 1, 2. We have
14 We conclude that Φ m has balanced contributions.
2 Moreover, we have the following characterization, which is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998) .
Theorem 4.8 The marginal value Φ m is the unique solution concept onḠ N with |N | = 2 that is efficient and has balanced contributions.
Proof. Let |N | = 2. By definition, Φ m is efficient and from lemma 4.7 it follows that Φ m has balanced contributions onḠ N .
To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept onḠ N that is efficient and has balanced contributions. If G ∈Ḡ N is a one-person game then Ψ(G) = Φ m (G) because of efficiency.
Let G = (N, (R(S)) S∈S , A, (α i ) i∈N ) be a two-person game. By efficiency there exists a vector p = (p 1 , p 2 ) ∈ ∆ * (N ) such that Ψ(G) = (p 1 , p 2 )R(N ). Next to this, Ψ has balanced contributions:
.
By efficiency we have
Using p 1 + p 2 = 1 leads to
from which we conclude that Ψ = Φ m .
2
Of course, this characterization also holds for the dividend value and the selector value, as lemma 4.7 indicates. For three-person games, the three solution concepts can all be different, as the following example shows. Notice that the selector value is not efficient. Further, Φ s i (G) = Φ d i (G) for i = 1, 3. This is due to the fact that both the players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and so, linear functions f i . The inequality Φ s 2 (G) = Φ d 2 (G) comes from the preferences of player 2: ∆ {1,2} (G) = 1 ∼ 2 1/2 · R(N) and d {1,2} (G) = 1/2 ∼ 2 (1/2) 7/6 R(N ). Therefore,
A Appendix
In this appendix we provide a characterization of the Shapley value on the class of TU games
This characterization is inspired by the characterization of the Shapley value on the class of superadditive games by Young (1985) and we use it in the proof of theorem 4.6.
Let C N be a set of TU games with player set N and let ψ be a solution concept on C N , that is, In the proof of this theorem we need a lemma that we present below. First, we introduce some definitions. Let the game (N, u T ) be the so-called unanimity game defined by 
For t ∈ {1, . . ., n} define ∆ t (v) = max T :|T |=t ∆ T (v). Let v 1 = T =∅ ∆ |T| (v)u T . Clearly, v 1 is symmetric, that is, v 1 (S 1 ) = v 1 (S 2 ) for all coalitions S 1 , S 2 such that |S 1 | = |S 2 |.
for all t ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Furthermore,
where the inequality follows from i / ∈ T for at least one coalition T with δ T (v) > 0. Let
Define the index k(v) = |{T |δ T (v) > 0}|. Let g be a solution on SG N that is efficient, symmetric and strongly monotonic. We show by induction on k(v) that g(v) = φ(v).
If k(v) = 0 then v = v 1 . Because v 1 is a symmetric game, all the players in N are symmetric.
From efficiency and symmetry we obtain g i (v) = v(N)/n = φ i (v) for all i ∈ N .
Now assume that g(v) = φ(v) for all games v ∈ SG N with k(v) ≤ k − 1, for some positive integer k. Let v ∈ SG N be a game with k(v) = k. Define D = ∩ T =∅,δ T (v)>0 T .
First, let i ∈ N \ D. Define the game (N, w i ) by
According to (A.6) we can rewrite this to
By lemma A.2 w i ∈ SG N and k(w i ) ≤ k(v) − 1 = k − 1. Then g(w i ) = φ(w i ) (A.7)
by induction.
